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Philippe Boudon
The Point of View of Measurement 
in Architectural Conception: 
From the Question of Scale to  Scale as Question
Reflecting on the width of my bathroom I end up finding myself in a state of great perplexity as I try to know why (I’ll be damned!) it had to have 
twice the wave length in the void of the radiation cor-
responding to the transition between the levels 2p10 
and 5d5 of the krypton -86 atom; or, to put it more 
simply yet more grossly (a passage from the simple to 
the gross whose consequences should be measured), 
why did the bathroom’s dimension have to be (2/10)7 
of the quarter of the earth’s meridian.
For my bathroom measures 2 meters, and that is in-
deed what we are talking about to the extent that the 
meter is defined by the above mentioned elements.
It then made more sense for me to consider 
that the width of my bathroom corresponded to the 
bathtub’s length, however paradoxical it might appear 
to measure the former by the latter whereas I had taken 
great care to choose the latter in terms of the former.
More satisfied to use my bathroom as an instrument 
of measurement relevant to the size of my bathroom, 
I then realized that things were not so simple. For the 
width of my bathroom was also equal to that of my kit-
chen, as imposed by the latter’s proximity. Although 
this correspondence did not come about as a result 
of a necessary choice initially because my bathroom 
could just as well have found itself next to a stair. More-
over, the aforementioned width was also equal to the 
length of my daughter’s bedroom wall, subject to sub-
stracting the width of a closet, itself corresponding to 
the possibility consistent with the installation of a bed. 
A bed, a closet, a bathtub: all are things which everyone 
can imagine more or less and there is no need for me to 
give the reader the dimensions of those objects.
From the outset,                                                                      the pre-
ceding thoughts raised a number of problems
To begin with there is the question of the project. Alt-
hough the user is going to choose his bathtub in terms 
of his bathroom, the architect is going to layout the 
bathroom in terms of the bathtub. The situation is then 
quite the opposite and, from an epistemological point 
of view, it cannot be taken for granted to think of archi-
tecture in this manner since it is basically contrary to 
the way in which we deal with it on a daily basis.1
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Then comes the question of the relevance of the 
measurement: what interest is there in establishing a 
relation between the length of a quarter of the meri-
dian and the length of kitchen? None whatsoever will 
be the reply, even though we remain objectively scien-
tific, if one accepts that that there can be science only 
of the measurable. But regardless of the exactness of 
the length of my bathroom thus measured, we feel the 
inanity of the formula just the same. Let us note that 
the question raised is not the same as that shown by 
Bachelard on the excesses of precision.2 It is of a dif-
ferent nature since it involves choosing the measure-
ment that is of interest to us. A remark by an art historian 
mentioning the fact that the length of the city of Henri-
chemont is equal to the diagonal of the city of Richelieu 
will be of no interest, regardless of the mode of measu-
rement and its degree of precision, unless we are given 
the relevance of the statement.3
Next we are faced with the question of the dimen-
sion. With the legitimate concern of tearing down my 
bathtub I worry more about the length of my bath-
room than its height. The latter is of little interest to me 
(in my capacity as the user, although I recognize that 
the architect must have made some kind of decision 
in that respect). The width of the bathroom interests 
me little also since I cannot use it to place my bathtub, 
whereas the sink and other washroom accessories will 
have no difficulty finding their spot. The relevance 
that I have mentioned will apply to such and such phy-
sical support whose measurement I shall take into con-
sideration. Thus, I shall call dimension that which I mea-
sure. When Le Corbusier attributes 7 meters to the dia-
gonal of the maison des artisans over which he installs 
a mezzanine, the diagonal constitutes a dimension of 
this architectural object. The height of the Eiffeltower 
is certainly a priviledged dimension but its weight is 
not less important since the lightness of its structural 
idea is essential to the tower (its weight corresponds 
to that of of the prism of air of the same height and the 
same base). It is another way to take the measurement 
of the tower. Another scale.
Though I might give priority to my concern with 
the installation of my bathtub lengthwise, but the 
architect, in turn, must not have chosen the other di-
mensions of my bathroom unthinkingly. The length 
perhaps has something to do with technical problems 
of span and the height with a concern for optimiza-
tion relative to the building. I can also imagine that 
in the architect’s mind these constraints may be as-
sociated with different values and are part of an over-
all view of an entire set of constraints arising from the 
measurements he has taken to carry out his project. I 
imagine also that, consequently, he judges these mea-
surements on given levels which are different from the 
one that holds my attention:the one concerning my 
bathtub. But who is to say that he was not merely sa-
tisfied with the “compatibility” between the length of 
my bathroom and the possibility of placing a bathtub 
there? Whereas his initial concern was for the length to 
fit in as a full division of the width of the building itself. 
Here, it seems to me, that basically he does not think 
out problems in the same space as I do. I am in a space 
of usage, of perception, he is in a space of conception.
The different measurements – including the length of 
my bathroom – are part of a set of other measurements 
which, once connected to each other, give form in the 
architect’s eyes to a system. The relations between the 
measurements can be of different orders; these can 
be designated through graphs of varying complexity 
including the tree4 or, at the other end – an extreme 
case –they can remain independent of each other.5 
And I am suddenly frightened at such complexity, to 
which is added the fact that the length of my bath-
room is equivalent to the width of my kitchen. And yet 
in the long run a bathroom is a simple thing for which 
numerous models come to mind. We have before us, 
then, a doubly determined length. The latter is even 
overdetermined since my kitchen’s width is itself equal 
to the width of the elevator shaft, the landing, and the 
stairway added together...
Relevance of measurement, dimension, levels, sys-
tem, overdetermination, and model indicate some of 
the major interrogations on questions of measurement 
in architecture. The term scale is ever ready to refer to 
them through a system of polysemy that seems inhe-
rent to it and that is destined to express through words, 
as a shortcut, facts of measurement which are highly 
complex.6 The first of these facts is that of the project 
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which must, as such, shift onto reality. It is an issue of 
scale. How is the project to be articulated through rea-
lity, through real space: the question of shifting.
Question of project: scale as shifting
So we are then concerned with the question of measure-
ment.7 But, right from the start, we run into an impor-
tant epistemological problem. The term measurement 
must be understood in a different manner whenever 
it comes down to thinking it out in the field of architec-
ture. Taking the measurements of a building does not 
differ in any way from everyday measurements as we 
know them (why not in our bathroom before buying 
the bathtub), but the measurement in which the archi-
tect becomes involved in of necessity 8 for his work has 
the particular characteristic that the object measured 
is not given at all a priori. Instead, he must give mea-
surements to an object that as yet has none. What is at 
stake here epistemologically? It is necessary to think 
out this measurement outside the context of problems 
it gives rise to elsewhere, as in physics or geography; 
and irrespective of the real complications involved, 
though perhaps of a different nature, in thinking it out 
in the above-mentioned fields.9 
We shall not deny here that – over and beyond the 
problem of the tub, which though it represents a special 
situation it is as real a situation as those encountered by 
the architect – the geographer or the physicist themsel-
ves will not run into difficulties (some of which are even 
found in architecture) in thinking out measurements. 
The first will select theoretically relevant dimensions 
for the territory he intends to explore. The second will 
take measurements with infinite care while at the same 
time being unable to reach the infinite; for dipping the 
thermometer into the liquid will automatically change 
– however minimally – the temperature.10
As in the case of the tub, all of these questions can 
confront the architect himself. With respect to a na-
tural or urban site they can involve, for example, the 
problem of selecting the relevant dimensions on the 
one hand, and problems concerning the instruments 
for measuring used, on the other. But however impor-
tant these parameters might seem to be – such as the 
graphic scale chosen by the architect for his drawing 
or the pernicious effects of the so-called “crane-route” 
architecture – and whatever need both geographer 
and physicist might have to set up theoretical models 
without which they would be unable to take measure-
ments and with which they can confront reality in or-
der to test the model’s validity, they are all dealing with 
a given, whose measurements they will then proceed 
to take. The architect however, is going to have to give 
measurements to the building. Nothing will affect 
this process even if the surveyor, the aesthete, the 
art historian and the critic proceed to take measure-
ments with respective aesthetic or metric gauges.11
There are cases, however, when an architect may be 
called upon to inscribe his design into an architectural 
given: The Gare d’Orsay is one such case whereby the 
architect had to change the given station into a mu-
seum (the question concerning the thermometer 
would indeed be raised here: To what extent did the 
measurements of the 20th century architect distort 
those of the 19th century architect?). But this situation, 
however frequent, is also very special; and, in any case, 
the architect is going to have to, in the given context 
and no matter what, give measurements to her pro-
ject. This is why it becomes imperative to distinguish 
between two classes of measurements: those which are 
given, such as the site, the materials, the programme 
(usages, costs, etc.) and many others which range 
from construction site tools to graphic instruments. 
And then there are those which emanate from the 
designer’s intentions and work, regardless of how suc-
cessful the result is.
From the epistemological point of view it is the se-
cond group that seems to raise a major problem. We 
know that the physicist is 
motivated by the deep conviction that nature, in spite 
of its apparent complexity, obeys principal laws that are 
simple and general and which our mind is capable of 
discovering and analysing.12 
However, this confrontation with reality could not ser-
ve, in13 principle, as driving force for investigation by an 
architecturology or, in more general terms, by a science 
working on the the artificial. In the event that a science 
has to deal with the artificial it is difficult to envision 
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the «reality» to which it can refer for confirmation (or 
invalidation) of its models. By definition nothing can 
be taken for granted. The very idea of a science of the 
artificial would tend to weaken and be replaced by 
creativity, and the designer’s imagination and free-
will, should the artificial fail to implant itself in a given 
reality. In the face of unlimited possibilities for creati-
vity a place for a science of the artificial can take form.
In architecture, givens do exist: the geographic site, 
natural or urban; the technical and financial considera-
tions; the history of architecture itself with its assemblage 
of edifices and models; All the environments in which 
the artifact which the architectural object will find itself, 
whether those environments are taken into considera-
tion or not during conception. By this fact alone, the 
class of givens moves over to that of intentions becau-
se the taking into account of the givens passes through 
the design of a project. Whereas the physicist’s model is 
‘confronted’ with a reality (in conventional situations), 
the architect’s (or, usually that of the designer of an arti-
fact) would be described as ”shifted” onto the real. And 
it is precisely this shifting that converts the issue of “the 
scale” into a problem for the architect and into a series 
of questions for architecturology. Let us assume that the 
shifting represents only a problem for the cartographer 
involving, for example, the graphic inscription linking 
the map to the territory, that is, to its own referent. 
But the shifting cannot be treated in the same terms 
in matters concerning the architect since the latter is 
by definition, deprived of a referent. The architect finds 
himself in a project mode, in which he has to deal with 
the problem, or rather, the problems of scale through 
which he must carry the project so that it is gripped 
onto the real. We encounter here one of the meanings 
of the term scale: the scale of the map is tantamount to 
shifting the latter onto the territory.13 But supposing that 
for the cartographer the shifting involves a problem of 
conventions (I am simplifying here and I apologize for 
it), for the architect the problem presents itself in terms 
of conception. 
Obviously similar givens exist potentially in infinite 
numbers. The most common one is perhaps the parcel 
on which the architect is going to build. Its influence 
can be decisive to a lesser or to a greater degree. Thus, 
we have the Flat Iron in Manhattan that is informed by 
its parcel, and Palladio’s Villa Rotonda in Vicenza which, 
at that level, is in total contrast irrespectively of the 
non-historicism of such a proposition whose theore-
tical value, as I see it, is not diminished in any way. Even 
if we exclude the genius of Palladio or the fascination 
of Manhattan there still remains the possibility of esta-
blishing a major theoretical distinction between two 
architectural objects and their design on the basis of a 
parcel that does or does not inform the measurements 
of the object. The same holds partly true for the diffe-
rence between Le Corbusier’s plan Voisin for Paris and 
the parcellar distribution in the Halles which he wants 
to replace.
Let us call parcellar scale that which, characterized 
by the parcel, will inform the building. The variety of 
modalities for such information will be maximal. Ne-
vertheless the parcellar scale will not be reduced in 
any way as a fact which acts as a constituent element 
of conception. Piazza Navonnna inherits its morpholo-
gy from the Roman circus. The Flat Iron draws its form 
(and name) from the pointed parcel on which it is cons-
tructed at the corner of Broadway and 5th Avenue (Fig. 
14 of my preceding article). We also have before us a 
radical difference between the traditional city and the 
Great Ensemble. The first corresponds to a parcellar 
scale and the second to a geometric scale. Let us take 
care not to consider these spaces of reference as “con-
straints”. With a few exceptions it is up to the designer 
and his intentions to put them into play in an active 
manner in the realm of conception. They are all modes 
of shifting.
With respect to the above kinds of constituent 
measurements, it would seem that we find ourselves 
at a rather considerable distance form the geographer 
or the physicist. The architect, indeed, has to deal with 
a reality, which he appropriates (as does the client) and 
which is dependent on his representations of the same 
reality. And it is onto this – represented – reality that 
he is going to “shift” the design, whether he is deal-
ing with a visible, social, economic, or geographical 
reality. One aspect of the full tenor of the term “scale” 
is that of designating the variety of the references that 
will enter into play in conception. Compare, for example, 
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the variety of references of a social order accounted for 
by Jean-Pierr Martinon in the article that follows.
But what can justify reducing such a variety to the 
single term scale ? 
Question of measurement: scale as relevance
The reason I have attributed a central role to scale in 
the aims of architecturology is in connection with a 
heuristic hypothesis relative to the scale. It is here 
that resides the difference in the manner of thinking 
space for geometry and the other manner – to be stu-
died by architecturology – for architecture. For the 
architect’s cube is not the same as the geometrician’s: 
it has a measurement. The cube’s dimension is of no 
interest to the geometrician whereas for an architect 
a 3 meter as opposed to a 30 meter cube are not the 
same thing. As Valéry puts it in his Eupalinos: »Everyth-
ing changes with size».
The formula disputes the validity of the invariance 
of scale of scaling figures propounded by the mathe-
matician Mandelbrot. Those figures are not rejected 
per se, that is, as mathematical figures (In my view frac-
tal objects provide a better example)14 which continue 
to contribute to the construction of a geometric space 
without scale, the same one invented by Thales. Michel 
Serres has described well the beginning of Thales’ in-
vention, but when he states that Thales invented the 
scale, the scale invented is very special since it establi-
hes the similarity of similar triangles and denies their 
difference, a difference which in the architect’s eyes 
corresponds precisely to the difference of scale. For ar-
chitecture, triangles are not similar, could not assume 
the same meaning, or have the same relevance.
The geometrician’s scale – which is also the 
cartographer’s – implies a proportion which, inversely, 
requires the scale. The architect and, in his own man-
ner, the cartographer use scale also for the purposes 
of representation; however, at the level of conception 
the geometrician’s and the cartographer’s scale has va-
lue only as a false representation of the work of con-
ception. It is Viollet-le-Duc, as the first to make a distinc-
tion between scale and proportion,15 who writes that 
«in architecture, one cannot say that 2 is to 4 as 200 is 
to 400».
Nevertheless it is necessary for the above difference 
to be made clear for the scale, which was barely per-
ceived by Vitruvius, denied by Leonard de Vinci,16 un-
derstood by Galileo, undetected by Quatremère,17 was 
not that clear even for Viollet-le-Duc (and extended 
so far as the aporia of Le Corbusier’s Modulor).18 The 
conceptual distinction is so difficult to accept and the 
paradigm of proportions is so imbedded in our minds, 
that the scale ends up designating the relation of si-
milarity that is responsible for the elimination of all dis-
tinction ... of scale. Even Poincaré will fall victim to this ef-
fect by imagining a universe with doubled dimensions 
while failing to consider the repercussions due to the 
differentiated growth of diverse parameters.
Viollet-le-Duc explains well a major difference bet-
ween Greek and Roman architecture: he tells us that 
the first does not have a scale since the temple will pro-
portionately reduce or increase its parts according 
to its small or large size, whereas the Roman temple 
whether small or large will not change certainparts, 
such as the steps or doors, which are determined by 
human measurements and vary in size no matter what 
the dimension of the temple may be. But that does 
not imply that the Greek temple can expand indefinitely 
without encountering difficulties since, as Galileo 
showed for the skeleton, it has constraints imposed by 
the scale.19 Neither can the temple be without a scale; 
contrary to what Viollet-le-Duc maintains, it cannot be 
just pure geometry.
But the question is not even limited to the considera-
tions on the scale as formulated by Galileo: supposing 
(as Poincaré might have done)that it would be techni-
cally possible to carry out a purely geometric enlarge-
ment of architectural space into a limited architectural 
space, the fact that this space could be drawn on paper 
and freed from technical constraints, as Boullée lets us 
imagine, it would not mean that the resulting effects 
created (optical, symbolic, etc.) would be the same. This 
obvious fact merits a reminder if only because it indica-
tes that the questions of scale in architecture cannot be 
limited to the kinds of problems raised by Galileo (in 
architecture it involves a specific case of a technical 
nature which I refer specifically by the term technical 
scale) and that Valéry’s «all changes with size» encom-
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passes mutiple difficulties whose technical aspects 
represent but one part. Whatever the proportions a 
temple might have, a size is conferred to it: how? For 
example, in the case of the Parthenon, if Doxiadis is 
correct, it is a view angle which determines its size. In 
architecturological terms this means an optical scale,20 
or else this means a certain relevance within a potential 
multiplicity of cases. We can therefore speak of diverse 
scales since the possible relevances are multiple.
But here our problems are not over for Valéry’s 
proposition, however superb, is false.21 To begin 
with, within certain limits, within certain the temple 
can be more or less large andnot everything chan-
ges with magnitude (otherwise all models would be 
excluded). But what is even more serious about the 
Valerian proposition is that it might be interpreted as 
if the change were a function of the magnitude. This 
magnitude (size, dimension, whatever) is supposedly 
a parameter22 as if the scale existed in and of itself, as 
if it were a graduated ruler, in short, as if the scale ex-
isted in the singular, measuring «the» magnitude. But 
the size here cannot exist as such, independent of the 
multiplicity of heterogeneous scales through which 
the architect articulates his work.
So we need to examine this graduated ruler since 
that is the common name covered by the term scale, 
a term initially defined in the following manner by a 
famous encyclopedia – since it was the first – and to 
whose author the present one renders a tribute: 
In geography and in architecture, a scale is a line divided 
into equal parts and placed at the bottom of a map, a 
drawing, or a plan to serve as a common measurement 
for all the parts of a building or for all the distances or 
places in a map.
The psychologist’s and the economist’s scales are also 
graduated rules. As can also be the musician’s.
Even though we find ourselves far from the seman-
tic implications that the architect attributes to the term 
scale scale when he uses it and which originates in the 
multiplicity of factors that he is managing, it is wort-
hwhile to ask ourselves what is at stake in this “simple” 
graduated ruler.
As the cartographer, the architect is going to draw 
at a given scale. But individually, each will choose 
such and such a scale deemed to be most “relevant”. 
Nevertheless, the referent of the representation is 
not going to change because it is supposed to remain 
identical in all cases. Yet out of the possible infinite 
scales of representation a choice will enter into play in 
relation to the estimate made on a relevance of mea-
surement.
In spite of the identical referant the choice of scale 
corresponds to a point of view that changes the na-
ture of the scale. The angler with line and hook, the 
customs official and the navy officer will not deal with 
the coast of Brittany on the same scale and their dif-
ferent points of view would produce maps at different 
scales since the relevance of one’s ideal measurement 
does not necessarily correspond to the other’s. Whene-
ver a point of view participates in the constitution of a 
known object the resulting object will not be the same. 
But the perfect correspondence of the measurement 
found cannot be taken as a mere accompaniment of 
the measurement or as a simple improvement. Such 
correspondence in the measurement is precisely 
what constitutes it. B. Mandelbrot has shown that the 
coast of Brittany is of infinite length if you begin to re-
duce the unit of measurement. This is why not only 
does it make sense to choose a “good” unit of measu-
rement but also it is impossible to have a measurement 
without that choice. Without it the coast of Brittany is 
not measurable. Since this choice does not belong to 
the realm of mathematics23 we are obliged to put forth 
the the relevance of measurement as a key concept for 
the study of the measurement in architecture.
We then have the crucial notion of overdetermi-
nation (architecturological)24 since the multiplicity of 
possible relevances can affect the one and same mea-
sured object: minimally, the length of a lintel comes at 
the same time 25 from a measurement complexity of a 
technical nature (spanning/bearing) and a functional 
nature (passageway). It follows also from the above that 
the limit of an attributed measurement can depend 
on a given relevance or on another: the skyscraper can 
find a limit in height that may be induced not by the 
technical capability of realising such a structure as we 
might expect, but rather as a result of the number of 
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required elevators to service it and whose area of oc-
cupancy must not exceed... that of a floor.26
Question of system: scale as hierarchy
Thus, as to the essence-oriented question raised above, 
“does the scale exist?”, we have to answer no. As the 
relevance of the measurement it holds an infinite va-
riety of possibilities. By its very nature it is multiplicity 
and therefore irreductible as such to a single principle, 
unless the latter is arbitrarily imposed. An example 
would be the graduated ruler without any precaution 
taken with respect to the gradation.
Moreover the above variety is limited not only to 
the multiplicity of possible relevances but it extends 
also to the multiplicity of shifts. Let us ask once again 
how the architect’s cube is measured. Let us admit 
that the cubic form originates in the artist’s private 
sense of aesthetics over which we have no rights. The 
fact remains that the cube can be shifted onto in at 
least three different manners, depending on which 
of the three – length, depth, or height – provide the 
support for the shifting.Here, we also have to deal with 
the concept of dimension in addition to the concepts 
of relevance and shifting which I mentioned above.27 
From architecturology’s perspective, understanding 
the concept of dimension requires that it not be confu-
sed with dimension understood commonly as volume, 
or with dimension in its mathematical meaning.28 A 
cube whose measurement would be determined be-
cause of its depth is a single dimension architectural 
object. But it can have three dimensions should three 
measurement choices have been carried out indepen-
dently of each other and if they converge on an equal 
level with respect to the three measurements involved 
(for example, an aesthetic point of view concerning the 
width, for a front view, a technical point of view concer-
ning the depth, in cross section, and a functional point 
of view concerning the depth, in plan).
Thus, the architectural cube can evolve from a 
rather high number of different architecturological 
theoretical cases, even when we limit all of the pos-
sible dimensions to the sides of the cube and eliminate 
other and yet possible types of dimensions such as dia-
gonals or sets of sides. The latter case is quite plausible 
sinced Le Corbusier’s “maison des artisans” provides us 
with an example (the constituent dimension of that 
building is a horizontal diagonal).29 It is furthermore 
possible to find architectural objects with four dimen-
sions, such as a pool whose width, length, and depth 
on the shallow and deep ends are decided on separa-
tely.
All these examples chosen on purpose, illustrate the 
complexity of the facts of measurement once one 
adds (in a plausible manner all types of connections 
governing the dependency between dimensions and 
the values attributed to them by the designer (or the 
client, or the social or regulatory context) and which 
constitute the architectural object finally designed as 
a system (here the term designates merely a set of ele-
ments linked to each other). The well-known relation 
“of the whole to the parts and of the parts to the whole 
and of the parts among themselves” mentioned in all 
architectural treatises from Vitruvius to Venturi (“the 
heavy obligation of the whole”) enters into play here.
But in spite of its internal complexity the idea of sys-
tem leads us back to the question of unity. Very often 
a principal dimension will determine the place of the 
others.”With the height given, the width flows from it” 
(Le Corbusier).30 In that case, the architect speaks of 
scale, in the singular.31
I have drawn attention to the probable complexity 
of the system linking measurements among themsel-
ves and to the multiplicity of scales. However, the use 
of the term scale in the singular remains to be interpre-
ted, an interpretation which can be done in different 
ways.
I shall single out three of them. One way is for a ge-
neral rule to impose its structure to the whole from a 
given point of view. Thus Durand supposedly would 
have wanted to see built a round Pantheon since, as 
he put it, it would have cost less to the Nation. Such a 
conception falls under an economic scale. Architectu-
rology will describe that situation by saying that the 
global scale is constituted by a particular scale – eco-
nomic in this case –, or by a special relevance.
Another way is for the organization of the measure-
ments among themselves to produce a resulting scale 
through the comprehensiveness of the approach to a 
14 Nordisk Arkitekturforskning 1999:1
perception interpreted in a gestalt manner. As examp-
les of a scale produced by such structuring we have the 
scale of a Savoyard village, a Moroccan douar, a pueblo 
village, or the scale of Manhattan or that of Leningrad. 
The scale in these examples has nothing to do with the 
economic scale of the Pantheon or with the parcelar 
scale of the Flat Iron building.
These two first cases are in fact opposed depending 
on whether the whole determines the structure of the 
parts or whether it is structured by them. The first case 
is initiated by the whole “W” the second by the parts 
“p”.
We shall now see that the third possibility starts 
neither from the whole nor from the parts but rather 
from their reciprocal interactions It is only under such 
a situation that we shall speak of system in the strong 
sense of the term.
The model/scale system
Although above all interested in drawing the reader’s 
mind away from the preponderance of geometry,32 I 
have nevertheless spoken about the cube and shown 
that the architecturological cube was not the geome-
tric cube. And I have done so in order to clarify architec-
tural conception through that model. In fact it is highly 
unlikely for an architect to have to manipulate cubes 
or triangles (even if such is the case at times). That is 
why I spoke of an architecturological cube – not an ar-
chitectural one –, that is, a theoretical model intended 
for a better understanding of the particular reality that 
architecturology is seeking to comprehend: architec-
tural design. As in any theoretical model it too abst-
racts reality33 but it is important to know how far the 
degree of such abstraction is suitable. For the interest 
of a model lies in its capacity to provoke a critical exa-
mination of itself.
Rather than cubes or other triangles or pyramids, 
the architect does manipulate models corresponding 
to models bestowed on him historically. Pei’s pyramid, 
situated as it is in the Louvre, is not of geometric but of 
historical origin. Alain says, probably too didactically, 
that “every boat is copied from another boat”. Regard-
less of what type of scale he operates through the ar-
chitect is going to shift his model onto reality using one 
or a set of scales. But the model in question already has a 
scale as a result of its historical existence (I include here 
both great History – the Pyramids – and the lesser his-
tory – the neighbour’s house). In other words the archi-
tect is going to shift a scale (or, rather, a set of scales S2) 
onto a model M1 itself initially endowed with a scale S1 
(or, rather, a set of scales) and he is going to produce 
a new model M2. The preceding may be formulated: 
M1(S1) – ->S2 – ->M2(S2).
The range of possibilities available for the play of 
conception between S1 and S2 is considerably broad. 
The variety is high enough to allow a number of remar-
kable examples to stand out. Should S1 be equivalent 
to S2 then we are in the order of the copy. Every boat 
is not necessarily copied from another, but it can hap-
pen:doesn’t San Gallo build approximately the same 
portal as Brunelleschi ninety years after him on the 
plaza Santa-Maria Annunzziatta in Florence. But more 
fascinating still is the case where S2 is opposed to S1. 
This is illustrated by Pei’s pyramid which from the point 
of view of the technical scale replaces groundedness 
with lightness and, with respect to the constructive 
principle, weight with structure. As for the effects of 
“greatness” which seem to fascinate so much the aut-
hors of Treatises on Architecture they presuppose an 
application of S2 with respect to S1: Loo’s column for 
the Chicago Tribune competition with the height of a 
skyscraper.
Epistemological questions: scale as question
“It is then necessary to take up the question again and 
treat it thoroughly because it merits such conside-
ration”, thus wrote Viollet-le-Duc at the end of the 
preamble to the article Echelle in his Dictionnaire. He 
had been disheartened by the fact that his previous re-
marks – as was the case with those of his fellow scholar 
Lassus – had not been “heard”. To treat questions or to 
ask questions involves two different things. In one case 
we find ourselves in an architectural discourse, in the 
other we move over to an architecturological one.34 
One will have noticed that in this article I have not «tre-
ated» the question of scale. We have not looked for any 
type of «essence» of scale in accordance with Popper’s 
principle of anti-essentialism which is
Boudon: The Point of View of Measurement in Architectural Conception 15
never to give in to the temptation of taking seriously 
problems concerning words and their meaning. What 
must be taken seriously are those questions which con-
cern facts and the affirmations on those facts; that is, the 
theories and the hypotheses; the problems they solve 
and the problems they raise. 
What we are attempting to do here is to ask the princi-
pal question for architecturology: “how does the archi-
tect give measurements to space?”
It is the scale of course that gives rise to this ques-
tion since it enables me at first to point to the impos-
sibility of reducing architectural space to a geometric 
space, however readily available the latter may be to 
account for the former.35 So it is through the heuristic 
advancement of architecturology that scale emerges 
as an object of study and that is what is of interest. A 
second area of interest, also of a heuristic nature, re-
sides in the diversity of facts of measurement cha-
racteristic of architectural work which it forces us to 
identify. This approach is necessary due to the variety 
of modalities covered by its polysemy36 and due to the 
complexity too briefly described here with the help of a 
few notions such as shifting, dimension, overdetermi-
nation, and which we find among many others too nu-
merous to include in this article.37
The above notions generate true questions that may 
be asked of architectural design: How does the project 
accomplish the shifting? What are its (architecturologi-
cal) dimensions? Where do we find the overdetermina-
tions? Here, we are not treating the question of scale in 
architecture nor are we studying what certain authors 
view as a “formal invariant” in architecture or even as a 
“conceptual invariant”. Neither is it a matter of propo-
sing a representative model of architecture, although 
the epistemological difficulty involved here, is, as real: 
thus, Philippe Deshayes writes: 
In the field of architecture we encounter the same pro-
blem as that raised by G. Canguilhem in biology, name-
ly, that it is more difficult in that science as opposed to 
physics to resist the temptation of attributing to a mo-
del a value of representation.
In line with the above considerations by Philippe Des-
hayes and G. Canguilhem we can identify a posteriori 
models which belong to the order of a representatio-
nal epistemology – a conception of knowledge as ima-
ge and worldview,38 and a priori models which belong 
to a constructivist epistemology.39 The 
concept of scale, central for architecturology... results 
from a theoretical effect involving a priori constructions 
... whereas from another point of view it is an actual pro-
blem for the architect and, consequently, is subject to 
the problem of the representation of his work.40
Though the architectural scale is a question that that 
the architect asks himself,41 the architecturological, 
or,rather, the whole of architecturological scales are 
in turn questions asked of architecture, questions that 
will likely add a degree of differenciation to the funda-
mental question: »how does the architect give measu-
rements to space?» The fact that scale may have for ar-
chitecturological work a function close to that played 
by G. Holton’s «themata» which, according to him, sup-
port scientific work, must not overshadow the rupture 
that transforms the scale in architecturology into a set 
of questions to be raised, with it no longer being a ques-
tion to be treated 42. At this level we leave architecture 
in order to enter into architecturology. We abandon 
architectural space and turn our eyes toward architec-
turological space. The difficulty resides, however,in the 
fact that the first is not representative of the second.
The architecturological space
Constituting architecture as an object of knowledge 
means building an object43 different from architecture 
and to which we shall give the name of architecturolo-
gical space. In other words it is the space of conception 
seen as different from the architectural space (space of 
perception and usage) and approached from the point 
of view of measurement.
Since it is different from geometric and architec-
tural space, what can we say at this stage concerning 
architecturological space since its existence, in princi-
ple, has been demonstrated here through the type of 
architecturological cube described herein?
There was one question among all those referred 
to throughout the texte and mentioned with respect to 
the tub which has remained unasked: the question of 
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levels.
“At the level of”, “on a scale of” are expressions which 
are often interchangeable. They are governed by a 
paradigm of representation in which the plan has an 
important function as regards both the cartographer 
and the architect; the plan is intrinsically linked in its 
representative power to a scale. Brunelleschi’s archi-
tectural space and the perspective which he invented 
are bound to each other and the scale determines 
the dimensions of the perspective. With respect to 
Ambrosi Lorenzetti’s Annunciation to which Panofsky 
attributes a “considerable importance” that “resides in 
the rigour with which for the first time an artist forces 
the visible perpendiculars of he plan to converge on a 
unique and same point”, the author further writes that 
“the checkerboard pavement thereafter flows under 
the figures, thereby providing a scale for all spatial va-
lues, that apply both to the bodies themselves and to 
the intervals”.44 Though historians are often tempted to 
retrace the birth of architecture back to this Brunel-
leschian and Albertean period, this form of the archi-
tectural space was preceded by others and represents 
a historical moment only. But the idea of scale as level 
is closely related to the cartographic representation, 
or perspective, that accompanies it. In such a case the 
levels become subject to the cartographic paradigm 
without there being any need for that space whatso-
ever. The segmentation of the architecturological 
space into levels does not proceed from from either 
cartographic levels or scale.
A plan, such as Alvar Aalto’s for the Turun Sanomat 
newspaper building is for me a model of another type 
of model, a model without module. It is characteri-
zed by a multiplicity of scales. The multiplicity does not 
correspond to a unique event in his architecture. When 
asked “What is the module for this office?” –  Aalto writes 
that he said “I did not reply because I didn’t know”. If we 
consider the brick facade of his house in Muuratsalo, 
it also escapes moduled network. Extended more ge-
nerally to his architecture, we see that it consists of a 
space whose multiplicity of view points goes coun-
ter to the single point of view of the perspective. I 
have shown elsewhere how his vases are an illustration 
of such multiplicity.45
Alvar Aalto forces us to give relative value to the idea 
of a natural (so to speak) architectural space reduced 
to the essential and defined by its general isometry; 
one that Mies van der Rohe pushed to the limits. But 
such a space needs to be considered from within a per-
spective that is historical. So its value is not natural. To 
think through this “built” space, built by the architect 
that Brunelleschi was, means calling into question the 
presumption of singularity of scale.46
The rupture between architecture and architectu-
rology at the point of scale proceeds basically from 
a classical distinction between object and object of 
knowledge. It is eloquently expressed by Descartes: 
Although every architect knows that he knows the art 
of building, such a consideration is not indispensable 
for him to be actually an architect.
It doesn’t matter that here escartes was thinking less 
in terms of architecture than its use as a metaphor for a 
more general knowledge. Yet, instead of using the reci-
procal effects of external sciences47 as a means to gain 
better knowledge of architecture – even though the 
examples chosen were based on an architectural metap-
hor – the question for architecturology would be to pro-
duce a basis of knowledge to enrich the general epis-
temological landscape other than in a metaphorical 
manner. I maintain the hope that while I have limited 
myself to an examination of the architectural field from 
an architecturological vantage I will have raised ques-
tions concerning scale in the minds of those represent-
ing other disciplines. For, it seems to me, scale, however 
often it is used, is seldom questioned.48
Notes
1. Cf. P. Boudon, Sur l’espace architectural, 1971, Paris, Du-
nod, which proposes a transfer for the object of know-
ledge of architecture, taking it from buildings toward 
the work of conception (and not towards the method as 
had been advanced by C. Alexander and others). Several 
articles in the present work emphasize the importance of 
this point of view.
2. Cf. G. Bachelard, Essai sur la connaissance approchée, Pa-
ris, 1973.
3. In a review of my work Richelieu, ville nouvelle, the aut-
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hor criticized me for not having thought about associa-
ting these two measurements, but without a justification 
as to why such an association is necessary. Yet the work 
did refer to the importance of the relevance of the mea-
surement. Unfortunately, the history of art sometimes 
makes use of the analogy as a too hastily used tool.
4. Cf. Christopher Alexander, “La ville n’est pas un arbre”, 
Architecture Mouvement Continuité (today AMC), 1967, 
No 1: In this very important article for the theoretical 
reflection in architecture, the author opposes the arbores-
cent schemata of “tree-like thought” of the architect to the 
“semi-latticed” outline that is more representative of the 
traditional city.
5. An excellent example of autonomy of measurements is pro-
vided in Saint-Pierre en Voluwe (Belgium) by the medical 
student’s building of the University of Louvain-la-Neuve 
by the architect Lucien Kroll. There, the dimension of the 
windows are freed from subordination to the repetiti-
veness of the main structures which characterize modern 
architecture and extend to buildings from the most squa-
lid low-rental housing developments to the superb Mies 
van der Rohe buildings.
6. Reducing theoretical work in architecture to this particu-
lar aspect of measurement emanates from an unusual 
epistemological position in this field. In architecture, 
“theory” generally focuses on the Whole of Architectu-
re.
7. Quatremère de Quincy had understood the general na-
ture of measurement in architecture but he reduced it to 
Proportion alone. 
8. In spite of its specific nature the measurement constitutes 
a necessary and permanent fact of architecture through 
its historical and cultural transformations an as such, a 
theoretical object of general value. But that has nothing 
to do with the Shakespearean title of a recent publica-
tion: ”Measures for measures” (“MeasureMENTS for Mea-
sureMENTS” would have been a better title!) following the 
symposium «L’Architecture en question», where I gave a 
presentation entitled «Measurements of the measure». 
The Shakespearean title of the book missed the question! 
Translator’s note: Philippe Boudon wonders whether the 
English «measurement» does not convey better than 
the French «prise de mesure» the fundamental idea that 
the measurements are determined, and not taken, by 
the architect. 
9. For a cross-disciplinary approach cf. Les difficultés de la 
quantification de la mesure, published under the direc-
tion of J. Parrain-Vial, 1981, Paris.
10. We recognize, even at a macroscopic level of classical 
physics, that any act of measurement applied to a system 
upsets it up to a certain point.” (A.M. Munn, Freewill and 
Determinism, London, 1960).
11. To make myself clear, I start here with the conventional 
representation we may have of these fields. The same 
perhaps does not apply exactly to present-day physics 
which I do not take into consideration One might imagi-
ne, however, that through the “New Alliance” (Prigogine 
and Stengers) we might come accross epistemological 
questions criss-crossing between physics and the sciences 
of conception or architecturology.
12. Cf. J. Bok, “Un modèle d’auto-organisation”, in Colloque 
de Cerisy, L’auto-organisation. De la Physique au Politi-
que, Paris, 1983, p. 72, and D’une science à l’autre, under 
the direction of  I. Stengers, Paris, 1987.
13. cf. P. Boudon, Une architecture mesurée, Critique, p. 476–
77, janvier–février 1987. 
14. In an article in Débat (“Les fractales, les monstres et la 
beauté” mars, 1983) the mathematician B. Mandelbrot 
examines the architecture of the Opera and holds it to be 
a fractal object. Unfortunately, as I have shown (cf. op. cit., 
footnote 13, above) the former does not offer at all the 
characteristics defining the latter according to the author 
himself.  This assimilation between figures (without scale) 
and real objects (endowed with scale) indicate the limits 
on applying mathematical models to architectural ob-
jects. Cf. the drawing at the end of this article.
15. Consult the two individual articles, “Proportion” and 
“Echelle”, in his Dictionnaire de l’architecture française 
du XIe au XIVe siècle (1854), which remains as a major 
work on theory in architecture.
16. Vitruvius states that reduced models cannot find confir-
mation for any given operation in the functionning of 
normal scale models.I intend to show in what follows 
that this conclusion is false.” Cf. Carlo Pedretti’s introduc-
tion to the collective work Léonard de Vinci, ingénieur et 
architecte, Musée des Beaux-Arts de Montréal, 1987.
17. “Proportions are nothing but calculations of measure-
ments.”
18. Galileo was the first to point out that things changed 
from one scale to another even though the models could 
appear similar:”Note how from these demonstrations it 
becomes clear that it is impossible either for the art, or 
for nature itself to increase their constructions to enor-
mous dimensions; thus it would be impossible to build 
vessels, palaces or temples huge in size and whose oars, 
yards, beams, keys, and, in short, all other parts would 
still hold together.» See the concluding drawing in the 
foreword (Discours concernant deux sciences nouvelles, 
Paris, 1970, p. 170). The technical questions of scale of 
this nature are of major importance of course in architec-
ture, but are not the only ones.Even today still, the idea 
of an invariance of scale remains so strong that the phy-
sicist is obliged to rectify it:»As the physicist G.Weisbuch 
stated in a debate at the Colloque sur l’auto-organisation 
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in Cerisy-la-Salle (cf. op. cit. footnote 12 above):»Contrary 
to what could be expected the invariance of the scale 
is not the rule.» Curiously the author adds something 
rather telling for me:»It would be interesting however 
to study systems with an invariable scale», and he refers 
then to B. Mandebrot’s fractal objects. Would the reason 
for this lie in our inability to study the variations of scale? 
It is true that the question of the mutual independence 
of forms and dimensions of geometric figures creates diffi-
culties in physics As a result of this «fact» which ac-
cording to A. Koyre «forms the foundation of Euclid’s 
postulatum», La Place «finds an analogous example in 
the Newtonian world» (Koyré)»Should the dimensions 
of all bodies in the universe, their mutual distances and 
speeds come to increase or decrease proportionately, 
they would trace entirely similar curves to the ones they 
now form; the universe thus reduced to the smallest ima-
ginable space would still offer the same appearances to 
the observer. Consequently, these appearances are in-
dependent of the dimensions of the universe.» (Laplace, 
Système du monde, V, 6) As reported by Koyré again, 
P.-M.Schuhl shows how Poincaré allowed himself to be 
misled by such a thinking experience (cf. P.-M Schuhl, «Le 
thème de Gulliver et le postulat de Laplace», in Journal 
de Psychologie, 1947, N°2) should we extend the mutual 
implication of form and scale to the occurrence of the 
couple organizing-organized to which J.-L Le Moigne 
attributes enormous importance with respect to con-
ception?
19. Cf. preceding note.
20. Cf. C. Doxiadis, Raumordnung im griechischen Stad-
tebau, Berlin, 1937, Londres, Cambridge (Mass.), MIT, 
1972.
21. False, not because of Valéry’s supposed ignorance but 
because he is pushing as far as possible to get the idea 
of the question of scale accross (see footnote 23, which 
points to the difficulty involved). It is indeed a “capital 
correction”, according to the expression used by Jean-
Louis Le Moigne for the title of his article.
22. If you believe that science is possible only for the sake of 
the measurable it is always tempting to remain confused 
and hold the scales to be “parameters”, an attitude that 
deprives you from understanding the work of concept-
pion. Cf. also D’une science à l’autre, op. cit., p. 102.
23. Op. cit., footnote 13.
24. Obviously, I use the term neither with a Freudian nor a 
Marxist connotation.
25. As regards the use of the term “at the same time” I refer 
the reader to the importance attributed to it by Jean-
Louis Le Moigne through his emphasis on the role of the 
conjuction in the designer’s thinking, as distinguished 
from the analyst’s who tends to focus, if we may say so, on 
disjunction.
26. Even if the problem could be solved by a simple regrou-
ping of lifts allocated to given floors, that does not affect 
in any way the “eidetic” value of this example.
27. With Peano and Cantor we have an example of how the 
concept of dimension created major problems in mat-
hematics and led to fractal dimensions, so that it is no 
longer possible in mathematics to maintain that the 
mathematical dimension is “natural”.
28. It is meaningful to note that Moore and Allen begin their 
work Dimensions (French translation “L’Architecture sen-
sible, 1981, Dunod, Paris) with some considerations on 
the mathematical notion of dimension. The architect al-
ways has recourse to the mathematical paradigm in an 
effort to think architectural space, in spite of the inade-
quacy of the model in question.
29. If we enumerate the possible cases for the sides, facades 
and facade diagonals, or cube diagonals, we come up 
with at least thirty-three.
30. Cf. Le Corbusier, Précisions sur un état présent de 
l’urbanisme et de l’architecture, Paris, 1960.
31. My purpose here is not for the scale to be taken as a uni-
que notion with respect to perception. My comment 
addresses the problems of conception which relegate 
the scale to a necessary plural notion, as I have attemp-
ted to demonstrate. When considered instead as an ae-
sthetic notion, the scale must be understood in my view 
as a kind of isotopy with the change of scale correspon-
ding to a change of isotopy. But since I do not wish to tre-
at here this type of question of different order (aesthetic) 
may I refer you to my paper in the symposium Esthétique 
et sémiotique de l’espace, Urbino, 1987.
32. Cf. footnote 35 above, as well as many statements made 
by architects (such as Boffil) explaining that architecture is 
geometry. H. Focillon has understood the problem well, 
cf. op. cit., note 1. See Philippe Deshayes on the relation 
between geometry and architecture.
33. Cf. P. Boudon, “Conception et conception architecturale: 
architecturologie et science de l’artificiel”, in Sciences de 
l’intelligence, sciences de l’artificiel, Lyon, 1986. For Jean-
Louis Le Moigne (on the topic of scientific pratice) “the 
very concept of modelling is still a new idea”. He stipula-
tes that “modelling postulates a priori not only the plu-
rality of conceivable models for the same phenomenon, 
but above all the plurality of methods of modelling» (J-L 
Le Moigne, La théorie du système général, 2e ed. 1984, 
Paris, 1977, p. 14). This question can become quite com-
plicated if extended to the field of architecture. On the 
one hand, we may consider the architect to be a «mo-
del maker» on the other, isn’t he a model maker unbek-
nownst to him? All depends on the concept of a model 
that we have in mind. In his article here, Jean Louis Le 
Moigne establishes through the concordance with the 
real a link between the notion of scale and model. El-
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sewhere he writes that «the debate on the “QUALITY” of a 
model can probably be developed beginning with the 
notion of “SCALE”» whose nature is fundamental in archi-
tecturology and therefore would be in modelling in ge-
neral.»
34. Cf. P. Boudon, Discours relatifs à l’architecture, Paris, 
1987.
35. It is necessary to make a distinction between geometric 
space as a tool of the architect and geometric space as 
a model for comprehension in architecturology, a func-
tion whose inadequacy is being questioned here.
36. Cf. op. cit. footnote 42.
37. Cf. Ibid.
38. G, Canguilhem, Etude d’histoire et de philosophie des 
sciences, Paris, 1975, p. 312.
39. Cf. P. Watzlawick et al., L’invention de la réalité, Paris, 
1984.
40. P. Deshayes, “Modèles A PRIORI et modèles A POSTERIORI 
du travail de l’architecte”, in La Recherche en architec-
ture, bilan international, Paris, 1984.
41. For example, the chapter “Echelle (scale)” by Charles 
Moore and Gerald Allen, “L’Architecture sensible, espace, 
échelle et forme, 1981, Dunod, Paris, in whose preface 
D. Duke and Philippe Deshayes write : ”G. Allen’s and C. 
Moore’s ‘dimensions’ act as a pragmatic echo to the theo-
retical interrogations of P. Boudon.»
42. G. Holton, L’imagination scientifique, Paris, 1981.
43. Cf. P. Boudon, “L’architecture comme objet de connais-
sance”, in Esprit, “Réveil de l’architecture?”, décembre 
1985.
44. E. Panofsky, La perspective comme forme symbolique. 
Paris, 1975.
45. P. Boudon, “Paysage de l’architecture, architecture du 
paysage”, Les annales de la Recherche urbaine, No 18–19, 
Paris,1983.
46. On the difficult question of the perspective, cf. Hubert 
Damisch, L’origine de la perspective, Paris, 1987.
47. Cf. P. Boudon, Introduction á L’Architecturologie, Paris, 
Dunod 1992.
48. It is possible to compare how little attention is paid to the 
term scale in the index of numerous works with the fre-
quent use of the term in the texts themselves. Insofar as 
I know only Paul Valéry and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (see 
my Foreword) seem to have considered this question. 
Others (Gilles-Gaston Granger, Jean Ullmo, Edgar Mo-
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